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ABSTRACT
From Bismarck to Maastricht: 
The March to European Union and the Labor Compact
This paper considers the likely impact that European Union (EU) will have on the labor compact.
It is argued that, despite increased economic integration in Europe, countries will still be able to
maintain distinct labor practices if they are willing to bear the cost of those practices.  The incidence
of many social protections probably already falls on workers.  In addition, it is argued that imperfect
mobility of capital, labor, goods and services will limit the pressure that integration will place on the
labor compact.  Evidence is presented suggesting that labor mobility among EU countries has not
increased after the elimination of remaining restrictions on intra-EU labor mobility in 1993.
Moreover, immigration from non-EU countries, which is much larger than intra-EU migration, has
declined since 1993.  Evidence is also reviewed suggesting that the demand for social protection
rises when countries are more open, and therefore subject to more severe external shocks.  This
finding suggests that increased economic integration and European Monetary Union could lead to
greater demand for social protection.  The U.S. experience with state workers’ compensation
insurance programs is offered as an example of enduring differences in labor market protections in
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1Quoted in Dawson (1890; pp. 34-35).
In the second half of the 19th Century Otto von Bismarck forcefully unified Germany and
established the world’s first modern social insurance system.  In the second half of the 20th Century,
Europe is being unified by diplomatic and political initiatives, best exemplified by the Treaty on
European Union signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992, but preceded by the Treaty of Rome
(1957), European Monetary System (1979), European Parliament, Single European Act (1986), and
Social Charter (1989).  Labor, capital, goods and services can now flow freely across borders in the
European Union (EU), and most EU countries share a common currency.  From Bismarck to
Maastricht, Europe is becoming economically and politically integrated, first as nation states, and
now as a continent.  
What impact will the integration of European economies have on the labor compact?  From
the outset I should be clear about what I mean by labor compact.  This intentionally vague term is
meant to capture the implicit bargain among labor, capital and government encompassing pay, work
effort, social protection, and labor such market rules as union organization, safety standards, and
termination laws.  The idea of a labor compact has more currency in Europe than in the U.S., where
employee-employer bargaining is diffuse and labor is not organized into a political party.  Even in
the U.S., however, are implicit arrangements that govern the employee-employer relationship, affect
the distribution of compensation and output, and provide social insurance.  In a speech to the
Reischstag on May 9, 1884, Bismarck described his vision of the labor compact as follows: 
Give the working man the right to work as long as he is healthy; assure him care
when he is sick; assure him maintenance when he is old.  ... [I]f the State will show
a little more Christian solicitude for the working man, then I believe that the
gentlemen of the Wyden [Socialist] programme will sound their bird-call in vain, and
that the thronging to them will cease as soon as working men see the Government
and legislative bodies are earnestly concerned for their welfare.
1
  2
     
2Interestingly, Bismarck never followed up on his promise of guaranteed employment.  
In short, Bismarck’s labor compact was to provide social insurance and guaranteed employment in
exchange for political stability and labor peace.
2  
In the decades following Bismarck’s reign, European nations adopted an extensive set of
labor policies and institutions, including generous Unemployment Insurance (UI), Workers’
Compensation insurance (WC), pensions, disability insurance, national health insurance, firing
restrictions, severance pay, health and safety regulation, job training, industry-wide bargaining, and
works councils.  Whether these practices cause labor market rigidities and unemployment is a subject
of much research in labor economics, and a topic for another day.  My interest here is in the effect
of economic integration on the labor compact.  
Many observers have argued that burgeoning European integration will fundamentally alter
the labor compact.  On the one hand, labor leaders fear that integration will provoke a "race to the
bottom," weakening labor standards and worker bargaining power.  On the other hand, business
leaders voice optimism that European integration will spontaneously generate greater flexibility in
the labor market, enhancing productivity growth, employment and living standards.  In this lecture
I try to provide an American perspective on the effect of European integration, and "globalization"
more generally, on the labor compact.  My thesis is that the likely impact of economic integration
on the labor compact has been exaggerated, both by those who fear a deterioration of labor
protections and pay, and by those who welcome it.  I suspect that integration will cause some
downward pressure on labor market protections, but the pressure will be modest, and European
nations will continue to maintain their generous and distinct labor practices.
At a theoretical level, the main argument that integration will weaken the labor compact is3
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4The possibility that government programs such as national health insurance could be efficient
and desirable despite seeming distortions from insurance is one of the themes of Victor Fuchs’s
classic 1976 paper.  Readers will also notice that I have unabashedly recycled part of Fuchs’s title.
as follows.  With free movement of factor inputs, goods, and services, noncompetitive cost
differentials will be competed away.  If government mandated benefits are particularly generous in
one nation, for example, then that nation will face a large inflow of immigrants who will depress
compensation, or an outflow of capital to nations with lower labor costs, which will also depress
compensation and raise unemployment.
3  Since comparative advantage and technology do not vary
a great deal across Europe, all countries will be driven to a common low standard of labor practices
in a "race to the bottom".  
This logic makes some sense, and I think it will generate limited pressure for changes in the
labor compact in some countries.  But three reasons lead me to doubt that the pressure to adopt a
uniform set of minimal labor standards across Europe will be very great.  First, although it is
common to treat the labor compact as a distortion that provides a drag on economic growth and
employment, certain aspects of the labor compact probably enhance economic efficiency.  For
example, the private market fails to provide adequate insurance against job loss (e.g., because of
adverse selection problems, correlated risks, and incentives for employers to provide
misinformation); when structured properly, government mandated UI improves the efficiency of the
labor market.
4  To the extent that the labor compact enhances labor market efficiency (compared to
the alternatives), economic integration will not cause an erosion of labor standards.  
Second, even with a common currency, imperfect mobility of factor inputs and goods and4
     
5If wages and other forms of compensation are inflexible, then the cost could be in the form of
higher unemployment. 
services will limit the pressure placed on uncompetitive labor practices.  Europeans are famous for
their national identities and low rates of labor migration.  Eliminating restrictions on labor mobility
has hardly changed this picture.  Moreover, unrestricted migration of EU nationals coincided with
a sharp reduction of non-EU immigration to Europe.  Since differences in working conditions and
compensation are much greater between EU and non-EU countries than among EU countries, this
tendency has insulated the labor compact even more than when within-EU labor mobility was
regulated.  Research summarized in the next section also suggests that the flow of capital and
finished goods is less than sufficient to arbitrage differences in labor market policies.  Even in a
unified Europe, geography will still matter, and provide a cushion against economic forces.
   A third and related issue concerns the political economy of the labor compact.  Fuchs (1976)
and Stigler (1975) remind us that in well functioning democracies, it is fruitful to view  legislation
as a reflection of what a majority of the public desires.  If the public desires protective labor
legislation, they will have it -- but they will pay for it.  For example, if workers in a jurisdiction
desire generous workers’ compensation benefits in the event of workplace injuries, then they can
legislate generous benefits and the cost of providing those benefits will be shifted to workers in the
form of lower pay.
5  The federalist system in the U.S. illustrates the fact that large differences in
social programs can exist in equilibrium.  Greater economic integration in Europe will likely raise
the cost of protective labor legislation, but I doubt the cost will be prohibitive; indeed, most of the
costs already are borne by labor because labor supply is relatively inelastic.  Another, perhaps
overriding political consideration, is that economic integration raises the level of risk that workers5
     
6The data sources are: Trends in International Migration, Annual Report, 1998 (OECD;
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12; U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Database for population data; and Statistiches Jahrbuch
1998 for German population data.
face, which in turn increases demand for social protection.
The remainder of this essay provides empirical evidence evaluating the likely impact of these
three factors that will offset pressure for a race to the bottom.  My conclusion is that the core of the
labor compact will likely remain intact in the foreseeable future despite increased European union,
although there will be some changes around the periphery of the labor-management-government
relationship. 
I.  Mobility of Factor Inputs and Outputs
A. Labor Mobility
On January 1, 1993, remaining restrictions on intra-EU labor mobility were removed.  If
labor flows in response to generous social benefits or supra-competitive working conditions are to
put pressure on the labor compact, one would expect to observe greater intra-Europe migration of
EU nationals after 1993 then before. To analyze migration flows, I make use of the OECD’s data on
inflows of population by nationality.
6  These data are far from perfect: different definitions of
migrants are used in different countries; many countries lack data; some countries exclude EU
nationals from their migration statistics; and data for some countries are available in some years and
not others.  
For six EU destination countries with available data, I calculated the migration rate as:6
     
7The EU was defined as 14 countries by some destination countries, and as 15 countries in other
destination countries.
ji jjßi Mij/jj Pj
where Mij is the number of people who migrated from origin country i to destination country j, and
Pj is the population of country j.  Migration data for some of the destination countries are unavailable
in some years (see the note to the Figure 1);  these countries were excluded from the numerator and
denominator of the migration rate in those years.  A migration rate was calculated separately for
migrants from all origin countries, and for migrants from EU origin countries.
7  Results are displayed
in Figure 1.
Weaknesses of the migration data notwithstanding, Figure 1 shows that mobility rates are
quite low between EU countries (from 0.1 to 0.2 percent of the destination countries’ population),
and that there is no tendency for migration to have increased after restrictions on labor mobility were
relaxed in 1993.  Another striking feature of Figure 1 is that the number of non-EU nationals
migrating to the EU was sharply curtailed after 1993.  Indeed, total migration is lower after 1993
than it was in 1988.  The decline in non-EU migration was largely a result of stricter government
policies and enforcement of the those policies vis-a-vis non-EU immigrants after 1993.  Because
living standards are much lower in non-EU countries than in the EU, this finding suggests there is
less downward pressure on labor standards due to labor flows after the restrictions on EU labor
mobility were relaxed than before.  
The changing mix of countries over time could partially account for the trends in Figure 1.
Consequently, Figure 2 provides estimates of migration rates just for Germany, where a longer time7
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denied asylum seekers from safe countries and safe "travel-through" countries entrance into
Germany. 
     
9These data are reported in Blanchflower and Oswald (1999), and are from the OECD Jobs Study
Part II (1994), Table 6.1.  The data for Britain are for 1986.
series of consistently-reported data is available.  Figure 2 shows the same pattern as Figure 1: a sharp
decline in migration from non-EU countries after 1993, and a very mild increase in migration from
EU countries after 1993.  Immigration from non-EU countries declined primarily because of more
restrictive policies concerning refugees and asylum seekers beginning in 1993.
8 
There is probably little reason to expect that intra-EU migration rates will increase much in
the future.  A notable feature of European countries is the low rate of population migration within
countries.  Internal, region-to-region migration rates are more than twice as high in the U.S. as in
many European countries.  In 1987, for example, 2.8 percent of Americans moved between state
boundaries, while 1.1 percent of Germans, 1.1 percent of Britons, and 0.5 percent of Italians moved
across regions within their respective countries.
9  Oswald (1999) offers the intriguing explanation
that differences in home ownership rates and associated policies are the cause of the lower mobility
in Europe, and this in turn raises the equilibrium rate of unemployment in Europe.  A related finding
by Decressin and Fatas (1995) is that regional economic shocks in EU nations are absorbed primarily
by changes in labor force participation, whereas in the U.S. they tend to be absorbed by internal
migration.  
If it is difficult to entice Spaniards to move from Seville to Madrid, as the following cartoon
suggests, it is unlikely they will move to Munich in search of better benefits.  Language, cultural,
and social barriers are likely to continue to provide roadblocks to perfect labor mobility -- to say8
nothing of the imperfect harmonization of retirement, health and education systems across countries.
One familiar comment is that migration among current EU countries exerts little pressure on
labor practices and compensation, but migration from Eastern Europe will pose a much greater threat
once those nations join the EU.  This is possible, but it should be noted that migration flows from
non-EU countries still substantially exceed those from EU countries, so it is possible that non-EU
flows could be restricted even further to offset a rise in immigration if eastern Europeans migrate
to EU countries in large numbers.
In the U.S., seemingly uncompetitive wage differentials  across regions, industries and small
and large firms for workers in the same occupation and skill class have persisted for decades despite
a relatively unregulated labor market (e.g., Brown and Medoff, 1989 and Krueger and Summers,
1988).  Moreover, the U.S. experience has been that free geographic mobility has only very slowly
led to convergence in income across regions (e.g., Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995), and studies have
not found that migration rates are related to the generosity of welfare benefits (e.g., Blank, 1988).
In view of this experience, it seems to me unlikely that the elimination of remaining restrictions on
labor migration across EU countries will lead to convergence in the terms and condition of
employment across Europe.  
B. Investment and Goods Flows 
Perfect mobility of labor is not necessary for competitive forces to eliminate uncompetitive
labor practices across countries; capital or goods flows could prove sufficient.  But again there are
reasons to suspect that frictions will prevent markets from arbitraging differences in labor practices.
A long-standing result in macroeconomics (e.g., Feldstein and Horioka, 1980) is that the investment9
in a country almost exactly equals the country’s domestic savings.  Although sudden and large capital
flows receive attention in the media and influence exchange rates, it is nonetheless the case that
investment is significantly biased to one’s home country.  Language, informational, network, and
social barriers probably play an important role in directing savings toward domestic projects, and
this is unlikely to change dramatically with increased European union.  
International Trade economists have also found a significant "home bias" in goods and
service flows.  A growing body of evidence summarized in Helliwell (1998) shows that international
borders matter much more for trade flows than would be expected from distance and size alone.  In
the period after NAFTA was implemented, for example, Helliwell (1998) finds that the trade of
goods between Canadian provinces was about 12 times greater than goods trade between Canadian
provinces and American states of comparable size and distance apart.  Interprovincial trade in
services was 25 to 30 times as dense as Canada-U.S. trade in services.  He also finds that national
borders have a substantial, though smaller, effect on trade between EU countries: internal trade
densities are about 6 times greater than international trade densities, and lower for countries that
share a common language.
Trade economists are fond of reminding labor economists that free trade should impact the
labor market via its effect on product prices; that is, price convergence, not goods traffic, is the
engine of economic integration.  Have goods prices converged among EU countries after the
introduction of the Single Market in 1993?  In recent work, Haffner, et al. (1999) find that price
structures have been converging among EU countries in 1980s and 1990s, and that prices are more
similar among EU countries than they are among other OECD countries.  But they also find that
price convergence in the EU has slowed down since the introduction of the Single Market.  It is10
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possible that European Monetary Union (EMU) could improve the transparency of prices, enhance
trade flows, and eradicate remaining price differentials in the EU.
10  Personally, I am skeptical of this
view.  Deflating by an exchange rate is not a very high-order skill in an age of computers and
electronic calculators; nor is exchanging currency very expensive (see Eichengreen, 1993).  It seems
unlikely to me that a common currency will have an appreciable impact on the volume or direction
of trade.  As a whole, these considerations suggest that increased integration in the future is unlikely
to be dramatically different than the experience of the past two decades.  
The U.S. Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill was famous for the axiom: "All politics is local."
It is not too much of a stretch to argue that, "Almost all economics is local."  In view of the frictions
that restrain economic integration, I think Dani Rodrik (1998; p. 13) correctly observes that, "While
the tradeoffs facing policy makers have been rendered steeper by the increased trade and capital
flows, there exists plenty of room for nation-states to maintain their own distinctive domestic social
arrangements."
II. The Political Economy of the Labor Compact
A consideration of political economy factors leads me to suspect that labor standards and
labor programs are unlikely to be weakened in the foreseeable future as a result of European union,
and may actually be strengthened.  
A.  Trade and Social Protection
In separate studies, Dani Rodrik (1997) and Jonas Agell (1999) find a positive relationship11
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(available from: <http://cansim.epas.utoronto.ca:5680/pwt/pwt.html>). 
between the openness of an economy (as measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP) and
the generosity of a variety of social welfare benefits and labor market characteristics.  Across
nations, they find that more open countries tend to have a higher union density rate, more centralized
bargaining, higher minimum wages relative to average wages, more compressed wage distributions,
more generous unemployment benefits, and a higher share of public expenditures in GDP.  This type
of phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 3, which presents a scatter diagram of labor market
expenditures as a percent of GDP in the late 1990s against the share of trade in GDP in 1989.
11  The
upward sloping Ordinary Least Squares regression line (t-ratio=2.52) shown on the graph indicates
that more open countries tend to devote a higher proportion of resources to labor market programs
including job training, youth measures, subsidized employment, unemployment compensation,
disability benefits, and early retirement programs.  Median regression, which is robust to outlying
observations, also yields an upward sloping relationship with a t-ratio of 1.66.
I also explored the relationship between the OECD’s summary measure of employment
protection and openness.  This bivariate correlation was positive but statistically insignificant.  Agell
also finds that the correlation between job protection and openness is statistically insignificant.
Nonetheless, there is no evidence that job protection is weaker in more open economies.  
The leading explanation for the positive association between social protection and openness
to trade is that more government intervention and social insurance is demanded when countries open
their borders to trade.  Rodrik, for example, writes: "Societies that expose themselves to greater
amounts of external risk demand (and receive) a larger government role as shelter from the12
vicissitudes of global markets. ...  Hence the conclusion that the social welfare state is the flip side
of the open economy!"  And Agell concludes that "increased openness may lead to increased
institutional involvement in the labour market."  If this is the case, then increased integration could
possibly increase, rather than decrease, the demand for social protection, at the same time that it
increases the costs of providing social protection.  
Another, and related phenomenon, concerns the potential effect of EMU on economic
volatility.  Because countries that adopt a common currency are unable to utilize monetary policy
to offset idiosyncratic country-specific macroeconomic shocks, business cycle swings could
intensify.  More frequent and intense boom and bust cycles, if they arise, are likely to increase the
demand for greater risk sharing, social insurance, and labor market regulation.  Although one might
presume that a recession is not a likely time to increase regulation or taxation, recall that the main
features of U.S. protective labor legislation and social insurance (including Social Security, the
minimum wage, overtime restrictions, the National Labor Relations Act, and unemployment
compensation) were established during the Great Depression. 
B. Monetary Union
European Monetary Union can have a number of other subtle and not-so-subtle effects on
the labor compact as well.  One obvious issue concerns the Growth and Stability Pact for nations that
join the Maastricht Treaty, and the deficit-to-GDP restrictions for those that aspire to join.
Maintaining low and stable debt is a condition for belonging to EMU.  It is tempting to believe that
binding debt and deficit restrictions will starve social welfare spending.  But this does not necessarily
follow.  In 1995, when the U.S. budget deficit was $150+ billion for as far as the eye could see, I13
have a vivid memory of U.S. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen noting in a meeting of the National
Economic Council in the Roosevelt Room of the White House that a salutary feature of a minimum
wage hike was that it would not add one dime to the U.S. deficit.  Instead of crimping the labor
compact, deficit restrictions could result in more government mandates on business to provide
benefits and services that the government would otherwise provide directly.  Indeed, it is possible
that policy makers in EMU member states will feel pressure to do something during a downturn, and
with monetary policy off limits and constraints on fiscal policy, the most popular alternatives may
be to support work sharing or raise future unemployment compensation, rather than weaken labor
programs.    
Bean (1998) and others argue that participation in EMU will enhance policy makers
incentives to introduce labor market flexibility to lower structural unemployment.  Calmfors (1998a)
has dubbed this the There is No Alternative view.  But, as Calmfors (1998a) notes, if monetary
policy is neutral in the long run, there is little reason to suspect that political incentives to alter labor
policies to reduce structural unemployment will be changed.  
Monetary union can also have many other subtle and uncertain effects on labor market
programs.  Calmfors (1998a and b) analyzes several possible effects EMU could have on labor
market programs.  On the one hand, his 1998b paper provides a model in which policy makers in the
EMU undertake labor market reforms such as reducing unemployment compensation as a precaution
to lower equilibrium unemployment because country-specific monetary policy can no longer be used
to offset asymmetric macro shocks.  On the other hand, Calmfors (1998a) notes that pressure for
labor market reform could be weakened among EMU members because a benefit of labor market
reforms that reduce equilibrium unemployment is that the inflation-bias of a nation’s monetary policy14
is reduced; this channel is severed for EMU nations since monetary policy is not set on a country
level.  Calmfors (1998a) also argues that EMU could lengthen the time lag between when reforms
are undertaken and when results are realized, which could further weaken the resolve to change the
labor compact.  In the end, I think Calmors (1998a) sensibly concludes that, "It is quite likely that
the EMU will not have any major impact on the extent of labour-market reform and structural
unemployment."  
C.  Practical Politics
It is notable that 14 of the 15 EU countries currently have center-left governments (depending
on who’s counting).  The popularity of more populist governments may, in part, result from anxiety
that the general public feels about European union.  Faced with much uncertainty about future
economic developments, voters may feel more secure with left-leaning politicians at the helm, in the
belief that they will maintain the labor compact and smooth the rough tides of economic integration.
Worried about the erosion of labor protections and social benefits?  Elect Gerhard Schroeder.
Opposed to Prime Minister Alain Juppe’s plan to cut the youth minimum wage?  Take to the streets
and elect Lionel Jospin.  Labor protections continue to be very popular.  Because, in the long run,
democratic politicians usually deliver what the voters want, I suspect that the current support for
center-left parties bodes well for the future of the labor compact; indeed, rather than erode, some
features of the labor compact may in fact be upgraded.
But I would hasten to add one important caveat to this interpretation of political events:
When a radical change in policy occurs, it is often the case that it is brought about by elected
officials from the party that traditionally is opposed to the change.  In the U.S. we call this15
phenomenon, "Nixon goes to China," since it took Richard Nixon, a Cold War warrior, to embrace
China.  Other examples abound: President Clinton abolished welfare as we know it; socialist
President Mitterand of France privatized some public sector functions in the 1980s; hawkish Israeli
Prime Minister Menachem Begin returned the Sinai to Egypt.  Indeed, even Bismarck provides a
good example: The Iron Chancellor established social insurance despite his bona fides as a reliable
conservative junker who previously had outlawed socialism.  
Most relevant for present purposes, after months of wavering, Chancellor Schroeder of
Germany embarked on an austerity course in the fall of 1998.  Whether Schroeder will succeed --
and whether other EU leaders will follow his lead -- remains to be seen.  But given Schroeder’s
Social Democratic party’s resounding defeats in regional elections in Brandenburg, Saarland,
Thuringia, Saxony and Berlin since his change of course, I suspect EU leaders will think twice
before tinkering with the social compact.   
Two recent economics articles provide asymmetric-information-based models to explain the
"Nixon goes to China" phenomenon (see Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998 and Cowen and Sutter,
1998).  In essence, their theory is that incumbent politicians have superior information concerning
the effects of certain policies than the public.  Politicians value both improving policy outcomes and
reelection.  If new information is obtained supporting a right-wing shift in policy, a left-wing
politician can more credibly signal that the policy is an appropriate course of action than a right-wing
politician because voters will infer that the left-wing politician is motivated by objective facts, rather
than his party’s natural ideological tendencies.  If this is an accurate explanation for policy reversals,
then it is unclear whether left-leaning policy makers in the EU will reverse course and weaken social
welfare programs because it is unclear what new information was revealed to them after taking16
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office.  And as Professor Dumbledore notes in Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, there is a
natural check on leaders who wish to desert their traditional base of support: "It takes a great deal
of bravery to stand up to our enemies, but just as much to stand up to our friends."
12   
III.  Lessons from Federalism
Ehrenberg (1994) and Freeman (1994) point out that in the U.S. federalist system, large
differentials in state labor programs and standards have persisted across regions despite unrestricted
labor, capital, and output mobility, and a common currency.  It is unlikely that commerce across
nation states in Europe will ever be more fluid or seamless than it is across states in the U.S., so a
lesson from U.S. federalism is that diverse labor compacts can survive in a more integrated European
Union. 
The U.S. workers’ compensation insurance system provides a good illustration of the wide
range of program variability across jurisdictions that can persist in equilibrium despite a high-level
of economic integration.  Workers’ compensation insurance is the oldest social insurance program
in the United States; most states initiated programs in the early 1900s.  The system still consists of
50 independently operated state programs.  States are free to set their benefit generosity at whatever
level the legislature chooses, and use whatever funding mechanism(s) they choose.  In all but two
states, employers are compelled to purchase insurance to cover claims by their employees in the
event of a work-related injury or illness.  Some states provide insurance directly to employers
through a state-operated fund, some permit private carriers to sell insurance, and some allow
employers to self insure; and varying combinations of these funding device are used by the states.17
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Total WC costs to employers in 1995 were $57 billion, more than 2.5 times as great as UI costs that
same year.
13  
Most important for our purposes, employer costs and employee benefits vary considerably
across states even for identical jobs.  For example, for truck drivers in 1987, costs ranged from a low
of 3 percent of payroll in Indiana to a high of 25 percent in Montana.  Differences in employer costs
across states are determined primarily by differences in benefit generosity (Krueger and Burton,
1990).  Table 1 illustrates the range of benefit generosity across the states that arises for selected
work injuries.  The loss of the use of a leg qualifies for $228,143 in Illinois, but only $48,000 in
neighboring Indiana.  Benefit levels for less severe injuries also vary considerably across the states.
Interstate variability in WC costs and benefits has persisted since the inception of the
program.  There was never a race to the bottom; programs have not converged to a common, low
level.  Indeed, the only period of significant convergence of costs and benefits occurred in the 1970s
and early 1980s, when the federal government threatened to take over the state programs.  During
this period benefits and costs increased more rapidly in the less generous states; a slow and
unfinished race to the top took place, until the threat of federalization of the program receded.  
It is also the case that, despite much rhetoric to the contrary, there is little support for the
view that employers chose their plant locations based on workers’ compensation insurance costs (see
Burton, 1966).
14  One reason why program generosity is unrelated to business location is that
employees’ value generous WC benefits, and are willing to take lower wage payments as a18
consequence (Gruber and Krueger, 1991).  More generally, even if nominal wages are rigid, society
may be willing to pay a price for generous social welfare programs in the form of higher product
prices or unemployment.
The limited experience from increased integration among a subset of EU nations is also
consistent with that of U.S. federalism.  Boeri (1999) points out that the DM-area countries (Austria,
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands) shared virtually the same currency for the last 20 years, yet
exhibited no tendency to converge to a common, low set of labor standards and programs in the
1980s and 1990s.  The effect of greater product market and monetary integration for the entire EU
may not be terribly different.
Many observers consider the Maastricht Treaty on European Union to have far greater
political than economic consequences.  As an American, I must confess to being wholly confused
about the domain, politics and power of the Council of Ministers, European Parliament, and
Commission.  But the charters and pronouncements of these bodies clearly carry some practical
weight.  And in this regard it seems possible to me that increased political integration could lead to
a certain "levelling up" of labor standards, where lagging countries are encouraged to raise their
standards to the highest existing level, just as the threat of federalization of state workers’
compensation insurance in the 1970s led to a levelling up of benefits.  Indeed, the 1989 Social
Charter, which was ratified by 11 countries, sets forth minimum standards concerning freedom of
association and collective bargaining, safety and health, work hours, and equal treatment of men and
women that could strengthen labor protections in low-standard countries.  Future charters could
expand these rights.19
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IV. Conclusion
Bismarck appreciated that the labor compact requires a constant balancing of societal goals
within the shifting boundaries of economic constraints. "Where is the limit," he once asked while
discussing Sunday labor restrictions, "up to which industry can be burdened without killing the hen
that lays the labourer’s golden egg?  When requirements are imposed upon industry for the
fulfillment of State purposes -- and the giving to all employees of a higher measure of contentment,
as to which industry may itself be indifferent, is a State purpose -- it is necessary very accurately to
know the limit up to which this industry may be burdened.  If we proceed to work without
considering this limit, and it may be without seeking it, we run the risk of loading industry with
burdens which it may be unable to bear."
15  
Every country’s labor market operates with some rules and institutions.  Despite popular
opinion in Europe, even the U.S. is a long way from unbridled cowboy capitalism.  The labor
compact in many European countries is extraordinarily generous to workers, probably reflecting
national values and norms.  "When in doubt," writes Josef Joffe (1999), "the English speakers will
go for liberty and the market while the Europeans will opt for equality and paternalism."  I suspect
that the economic forces being unleashed by economic integration in the European Union will tilt
the constraints that led to the existing labor compacts in member states.  But I also suspect that
policy-makers will nonetheless have a great deal of leeway to maintain distinctive labor compacts
in their countries, and that their constituents’ desires for protection from economic volatility will
increase because of economic and monetary union.  Although Bismarck warned that "No political
question can be brought to a perfect mathematical conclusion, so that book balances can be drawn20
up," when the dust settles I suspect that the competing forces of integration and demand for social
protection will roughly balance out, and that the broad outlines of today’s labor compact in European
nations will still be recognizable in the future.  
One final prediction I would make is that future pressure to relax product market restrictions
as a result of economic integration will likely be greater than pressure to relax labor market
standards.  Relaxing product market restrictions (e.g., limits on entrepreneurship) will probably be
more politically popular than cutting labor standards and social benefits.  Steve Pischke and I have
previously argued that product market restrictions are a more important source of Europe’s
employment problems than labor market restrictions, although both factors probably contribute (see
Krueger and Pischke, 1998).  Combining these two conjectures leads me to be something of a Euro-
optimist (Europtimist?) going forward.  21
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Table 1: Maximum Workers’ Compensation Benefit Payments for
Selected Disabilities, 12 States in 1996
                                                                 
State             Arm        Hand      Leg       Foot      Eye   
Arkansas         $53,130    $39,974   $46,552   $33,143   $26,565
Illinois         228,153    144,496   209,140   117,879   121,681
Indiana           48,000     34,000    41,000    27,000    27,000
Massachusetts     25,973     20,537    23,557    17,517    23,557
Michigan         140,956    112,660   112,660    84,888    84,888
Mississippi       52,910     39,683    46,296    33,069    26,455
New Jersey       116,160     70,560   110,880    58,880    44,800
New York         124,800     97,600   115,200    82,000    64,000
North Carolina   118,080     98,400    98,000    70,848    59,040
Pennsylvania     216,070    187,085   216,070    131,750  144,925
South Carolina    96,314     80,991    85,369     61,291   61,291
Texas             67,200     50,400    67,200     42,000   33,600
                                                                 
Source: State Workers’ Compensation Laws, U.S. Department of
Labor, Washington, D.C., 1996, Table 9a.  25
Figure 1: Migration to Six EU Countries as a 
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Notes: Six EU destination countries included are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.  Data are missing for Denmark and France
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Figure 2: EU and Non-EU Migration to Germany
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Sources: Author’s calculations based on OECD Trends in International Migration 1998, OECD International Migration Statistics on Diskette,
and Statististiches Jahrbuch, 1998, p. 41.  Migration and population data exclude East Germany prior to 1991.27
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